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JEFFERSON'S "WALL OF SEPARATION":
WHAT AND WHERE?
By EDWARD F. WAITE*
W HEN the thoughtful layman of a certain bent of mind knows
that the Supreme Court of the United States has unanimously
declared that "this is a Christian nation" and has never taken it
back; and when he sees on his coins "In God We Trust," notes
that Thanksgiving Day is a national holiday, observes that ses-
sions of each House of Congress are opened with prayer, is ad-
vised that there is compulsory church attendance at West Point
and the Annapolis Naval Academy, and recalls the ministrations
of his army or navy chaplain (paid from public funds), it gives
him a shock to be told that the same Cotirt recently seems to have
placed the ban of unconstitutionality on the familiar practice of
teaching religion to public school children in "released time."
The layman of a somewhat different mental attitude happens to
know that the Court has expressly approved Jefferson's famous
saying that the First Amendment "built a wall of separation be-
tween church and state"; and when he learns that two years ago
the same august tribunal upheld a New Jersey law, as not repugnant
to the Federal Constitution, which repaid to parents out of public
moneys sums they had spent to send their children to parochial
schools, he too is astonished. Even the lawyer, when he reads the
two most recent decisions and the accompanying dissents,' won-
ders how to reconcile both cases with both of the sounding phrases
which had been approved by the Court. If his attention has ever
been called to it, he is likely to think of Mr. Justice Holmes' pithy
sentence: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become
encysted in phrases, and thereafter for a long time cease to pro-
voke further analysis."
'2
In what sense, if at all, is this "a Christian nation"? Is there
"a wall of separation between church and state," and if so, where
is it, and what really does it separate? The words "church" and
"Christian," do not occur in the Constitution, and "religion"
only in Art. VI, which forbids a "religious test" for any office or
*Judge of the District Court, 4th Judicial District of Minnesota, 1911-
1941 (retired).
1. Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330
U. S. 1 (1947) ; People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education of School District No. 71, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
2. Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
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public trust under the United States, and in the First Amendment,
which consists of six prohibitions of legislation by Congress in
denial of or interference with certain important human rights. We
are here concerned with the first two, which are as follows:
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."
2. Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion.3
As one reflects upon these sentences his mind is crowded with
questions, none of which will the writer undertake to answer. He
proposes to himself only the modest-but he hopes useful-task
of showing what questions have been considered and what answers
given in decided cases where these two prohibitions have come for
interpretation before the final authority,--the Supreme Court of
the United States. Members of the Court have often reviewed the
conditions, events and discussions leading up to the adoption of
the First Amendment, not always agreeing as to what Madison,
Jefferson and the First Congress really meant. These historical
reviews are not within the scope of this study. We take the amend-
ment as we find it: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
What meaning, before the two recent decisions, did the Court
give to these carefully chosen words?
To some it may perhaps be a matter of surprise to know that
the earliest express construction of either prohibition by the Su-
preme Court occurred nearly a century after it was framed, in
Reynolds v. U. S.,4 decided in 1878. Before this, however, there
were several-cases in which the relation of government to religion
was referred to in terms which may be claimed to be relevant to
later decisions. The first was Terrett v. Taylor,5 in 1815. While the
Protestant Episcopal Church was the established church of Colonial
Virginia certain legislative acts provided for its incorporation and
tenure of property. These were repealed after the adoption of the
Federal Constitution. The controversy concerned property claimed
by an incorporated church, then within the District of Columbia,
on the one hand, and representatives of the State of Virginia on
the other. The Court was called upon to construe the constitution
and laws of Virginia and not the Federal Constitution. In deciding
3. The other prohibitions forbid laws abridging freedom of speech, of
the press, of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and of the right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.
4. 98 U. S. 148 (1878).
5. 9 Cranch. 43 (1815).
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the case Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the Court, used the fol-
lowing language, though clearly indicating that this did not cover
the effective reasons for its decision:
"Although it may be true that religion can be directed only by
reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and that all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to
the dictates of conscience, as the bill of rights of Virginia declares,
yet it is difficult to perceive how it follows as a consequence that
the legislature may not enact laws more effectually to enable all
sects to accomplish the great objects of religion by giving them
corporate rights for the management of their property, and the
regulation of their temporal as well as their spiritual concerns....
The free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be re-
strained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect
to perform their own religious duties ... "0
The Girard Will case7 is sometimes carelessly cited as though
it declared that the United States is a Christian nation. Such is
not the fact-it merely conceded arguendo that Christianity was a
part of the common law of Pennsylvania "in this qualified sense,
that its divine origin and truth are admitted"; and interpreting
the state constitution8 Mr. Justice Story for the Court declared-
"Language more comprehensive for the complete protection of
every variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used; and it
must have been intended to extend equally to all sects, whether
they believed in Christianity or not, and whether they were Jews
or infidels."" In response to the contention that the foundation of
the college upon the principles and exclusions prescribed by the
testator 10 was "derogatory and hostile to the Christian religion,
and so was void as being against the common law and public policy
of Pennsylvania," the Court said: "Why may not the Bible, and
6. Id. at 48.
7. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 126 (1844).
8. Quoted by the Court as follows: "That all men have a natural and
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own conscience; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or sup-
port any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent;
no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given by law to any
religious establishment or modes of worship." (Id. at 198.)
9. Ibid.
10. The testator had provided that "no ecclesiastic, missionary or
minister of any sect whatsoever" should ever have any part in the administra-
tion of the college, or be admitted to the premises. It was explained, however,
that this was not intended "to cast any reflection upon any sect or person,"
but to preserve the pupils from sectarian controversies. All teachers were
desired "to instill into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of
morality, so that on their entrance into active life they may, from inclina-
tion and habit, evince benevolence toward their fellow creatures, and a love
of truth, sobriety and industry, adopting at the same time such religious
tenets as their matured reason may enable them to prefer."
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especially the New Testament, without note or comment, be read
and taught (but by laymen only) as a divine revelation in the
college-its general precepts expounded, its evidences explained,
and its glorious -principles of morality inculcated? What is there
to prevent a work, not sectarian, upon the general evidences of
Christianity, from being read and taught in the college by lay
teachers? Certainly there is nothing in the Will that proscribes
such studies.""' It should be borne in mind that this language
construed only the constitution of Pennsylvania and the terms of
the Girard will, and had no reference to the Federal Constitution.
In the same term of Court in which the Girard Will case was de-
cided, the Court had before it a case arising under a municipal
ordinance. Counsel sought to present a federal question under the
First Amendment, but the Court dismissed the proceeding for the
reason that "The Constitution makes no provision for protecting
the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties;
this is left to the state constitutions and laws."12
Waison v. Jones"3 was a dispute between warring factions of
a Presbyterian church in Louisville, Ky., involving a question as
to which party constituted the church organization. It was held
that the decision of the governing body of the denomination was
binding upon legal tribunals. The First Amendment was not direct-
ly invoked; but the Court in an opinion by Justice Miller, used the
following language:
"In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate
the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe
personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no
sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to
assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine,
and to create the tribunals for the decision of controverted ques-
tions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical gov-
ernment of all the individual members, congregations and officers
within the association, is unquestioned.""4
In the Reynolds case,' 5 referred to above as the first avowedly
to interpret the First Amendment, an indictment for bigamy com-
mitted in the Territory of Utah was challenged on the ground that
it violated the right of the defendant to pursue his religious belief.
The Court, speaking by Chief Justice Waite, said:
11. Id. at 200.
12. Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845).
13. 13 Wall. 699 (1871).
14. Id. at 728.
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 148 (1878).
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"The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must
go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere
more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in
the midst of which the provision was adopted. The precise point
of the inquiry is, what is the religious liberty which has been
guaranteed ?"16
Following a brief historical review the Court quotes the fol-
lowing comment of Thomas Jefferson after the adoption of the
Amendment:
"Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the Govern-
ment reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which de-
clared that their Legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,'
thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.""1
The Court continues:
"Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the
advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authorita-
tive declaration of the scope and effect of the Amendment thus
secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order."' 8
Plural marriage was declared to be essentially an offense against
society, not to be tolerated in the name of religion. The statute was
sustained and the conviction affirmed.
Next came Davis v. Beason.19 A statute of the Territory of
Idaho which denied to polygamists the right to vote was attacked
as violative respectively of Article 6 of the Federal Constitution
and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The opinion of
Justice Field does not discuss Article 6 or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but goes more into detail in interpreting the First Amend-
ment than does the Reynolds case:
"The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his rela-
tions to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of rever-
ence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is
often confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a par-
ticular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. The First Amend-
ment to the Constitution, in declaring that Congress shall make
no law respecting the establishing of religion, or forbidding the
free exercise thereof, was intended to allow everyone under the
jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions re-
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 164.
18. Id. at 164.
19. 133 U. S. 333 (1889).
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specting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose
as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to ex-
hibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may think
proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit
legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of
worship of any sect ... It was never intended, or supposed, that
the Amendment could be invoked as a protection against legisla-
tion for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order
and morals of society.... However free the exercise of religion
may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country,
passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as
properly the subjects of punitive legislation."20
It should be noted that in this case the criminal charge before the
Court was again, as in the Reynolds case, an act and not merely a
belief or "religious" connection, the defendant being charged with
conspiracy to procure the registration as voters of members of the
Mormon Church, contrary to an Idaho law.
The Reynolds and Davis cases establish the principle that the
religious liberty secured by the second prohibition of the First
Amendment is subject to the inherent authority of Congress (and
under the 14th Ameidment and later decisions, the states) to
legislate within the limits of the police power for the general
welfare. This" is all that was decided. Jefferson's words were re-
garded by the Court as envisioning protection of opinion and of
modes of worship not subversive of public order or private rights,
and not anti-social action in the name of opinion; and to this
extent they were adopted.
Jefferson's phrase also has obvious application to the first pro-
hibition of the Amendment: and here, perhaps, some question
arises. Did the Court in approving it in the Reynolds case, con-
sider'that "church" meant "religion" as defined in the Davis case,
or organized religion,--i.e., sects and denominations, of which
latter meaning it is plainly susceptible? The writer has not found
the phrase quoted in any Supreme Court decision until Everson.2'
There it is used by the majority in support of the statement, made
rather as a concession than in support of the conclusion reached,
that "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups, and vice versa.122 In the McCollum case - it is evident
that the "wall of separation" was well to the fore in the minds of
20. Id. at 342, 343.
21. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
22. Id. at 16.
23. People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U. S. 203 (1948).
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all the members of the Court, with differing views as to what
and where it is.
The Supreme Court made its first and only pronouncement
that "this is a Christian nation," in Church of the Holy Trinity v.
U. S.24 Trinity Church, New York, brought a minister from Eng-
land under contract that he should become its rector. There was
an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to Prohibit the Importation
and Migration of Foreigners and Aliens under Contract or Agree-
ment to Perform Labor in the United States, its Territories and
the District of Columbia." The first section of the Act made it
unlawful "for any person . . . or corporation . . . to . . . in any
way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien
... to the United States ... under contract or agreement ... to
perform labor or services of any kind in the United States ....
In the 5th section domestic and various kinds of professional service
were excepted, but none of the express exceptions covered pastoral
duties. The Department of Justice prosecuted the church officials
and a penalty of $1,000 was assessed. After applying familiar rules
for the interpretation of statutes the Court, by Justice Brewer, con-
cluded: "We find, therefore, that the title of the Act, the evil
which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surround-
ing the appeal to Congress, the reports of the Committee of each
house, all concur that the intent of Congress was simply to stay
the influx of this cheap unskilled labor. ' 25 It would seem that when
this point was reached a reversal might have been ordered; but the
Court went on to say: "But beyond all these matters no purpose
of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, State
or Nation, because this is a religious people."20 Many instances are
cited of the recognition of Christianity in connection with the
settlement of the colonies, the establishment of the federal govern-
ment and the founding of several states. It then proceeds: "There
is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language
pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm
that this is a religious nation."21 Various common practices which
recognize Deity are mentioned, with the comment: "These and
many other matters which might be noticed add a volume of un-
official declarations to the mass of organic utterances that this is
a Christian nation.1
28
24. 143 U. S. 457 (1892).
25. Id. at 465.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 470.
28. Id. at 471.
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One can hardly read this case without deep sympathy for the
Court which had been driven into such a desperate comer by
Congress and the lower court. It was one of the "hard cases"
which have been said to "make bad law." Certainly it would be
bad law if the word "nation" must be taken to mean organized
government, as it often does, and if government discrimination
between "Christian" and non-Christian is implied. But such was
not the intention of the Court. Justice Brewer had in mind the
prevailing attitude of the people of the United States toward reli-
gion as a relevant fact to be taken into account in construing the
statute under consideration. The writer has not been able to find
any Supreme Court case in which the phrase "This is a Christian
nation" has been quoted. In the majority opinion in U. S. v.
Mackintoshe Justice Sutherland said, citing the Trinity Church
decision: "We are a Christian people, according to one another
the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with
reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God."3 0 Here the issue
involved the construction of a statutory oath and the language of
the Court merely recognized a relevant state of public sentiment.
Bradfield v. Roberts3' was the first case in which a direct issue
was sought to be raised under the "establishment of religion" pro-
hibition. It was a suit in equity in the District of Columbia brought
by a taxpayer to enjoin the payment of public moneys to Provi-
dence Hospital, under a contract, for certain additions to its plant.
The hospital was incorporated "for the care of such sick and in-
valid persons as may place themselves under the treatment and
care of the -said corporation," there being no other limitation of
beneficiaries. The bill alleged that the hospital was incorporated
by persons who were members of a Catholic order, and conducted
under its auspices; that this made it a sectarian institution and
that the appropriation of public funds for its use was contrary to
the First Amendment. A demurrer on the ground that the bill
did not state a cause of action was sustained. The Court said
(Peckham, J.) : "Whether the individuals who compose the cor-
poration under its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics ...
is not of the slightest consequence with reference to the law of its
incorporation, nor can the individual beliefs upon religious matters
of the various incorporators be inquired into. Nor is it material
that the hospital may be conducted under the auspices of the Roman
29. 283 U. S. 605 (1931).
30. Id. at 625.
31. 175 U. S. 291 (1899).
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Catholic Church. ' 32 The point decided was that the bill did not
show on its face that the corporation was a religious or sectarian
body.3  The only reference by the Court to this case on a constitu-
tional point prior to the Everson case occurred in Quick Bear v.
Leupp.3 4 That involved the payment by the Federal Government
to Indians of the Sioux tribe of their own funds, held in trust, for
the education of Indians in schools (Catholic) of their own choice.
The Court, speaking by Chief Justice Fuller, said: "It is not
contended that it is unconstitutional and it could not be,"," (cit-
ing Bradfield v. Roberts). Later in the opinion he said: "We
cannot concede the proposition that the Indians cannot be allowed
to use their own money to educate their children in the schools of
their own choice because the government is necessarily undenomi-
national, as it cannot make any law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The payment
was attacked under Acts of Congress declaring the policy that the
government shall make "no appropriation whatever for education
in any sectarian school"; and the Court quoted with approval the
declaration of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
that "it seems inconceivable that Congress shall have intended
to prohibit them from receiving religious education at their own
cost if they desire it; such an intent would be one to prohibit the
free exercise of religion among the Indians. ' "
The next instance of attempted reliance upon the First Amend-
ment in an attack upon legislation (in this instance an Act of Con-
gress) was in Arver v. U. S.3 7 The Act in question was the
Selective Draft Act of 1917, and it was contended that its exemp-
tion of certain classes of persons by reason of their religious calling
or belief rendered it unconstitutional. This claim was summarily
dismissed by the Court as follows: "We pass without anything
but statement the proposition that an establishment of religion or
32. Id. at 298
33. Immediately after this case arose Congress enacted a statute ce-
daring it to be "the policy of the government of the United States to make
no appropriation of money or property for the purpose of founding, main-
taining or aiding by payment for services, expenses, or otherwise, any church
or religious denomination, or-any institution or society which is under sec-
tarian or ecclesiastical control." 29 Stat. 411 (1896). Justice Rutledge, in his
dissenting opinion in the Everson case, refers to this case as "an instance
of highly artificial grounding to support a decision sustaining an appropria-
tion for the care of indigent patients pursuant to a contract with a private
hospital." Id. at 43.
34. 210 U. S. 50 (1908).
35. Id. at 81.
36. Id. at 82.
37. 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
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an interference with the free exercise thereof, repugnant to the
First Amendment, resulted from the exemption clauses of the act
.... because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require
us to do more.3 8
Before the "religious liberty" provisions of the First Amend-
ment were again before the Court, the "due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment began to be invoked in cases which in-
volved the public schools. It seems appropriate to consider them,
since this study has been inspired by recent cases of that sort.
Meyer v. Nebraska3 9 and Bartels v. Iowa= 0 were decided the same
day in 1923. In each a state law forbade the teaching of any foreign
language to public school pupils below a certain grade, and a
teacher was prosecuted for violating this law. In declaring the
Nebraska statute unconstitutional the Court, by Justice McRey-
nolds, said: "The problem for our determination is whether the
statute, as construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the liberty
guaranteed . . . by the Fourteenth Amendment. 'No state . . .
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."' The term "liberty," it was held, "denotes . . .
the right of the individual . . . to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.... The established doctrine is
that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action without reason-
able relation to some purpose within the competency of the state
to effect.' 41 The statute was an attempt by the legislature "mate-
rially to interfere with the calling of modem language teachers,
with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with
the power of parents to control the education of their own chil-
dren," and -was "without reasonable relation to any end within
the competency of the state."42 Justices Holmes and Sutherland
dissented without opinion. In Bartels Justice Holmes wrote a brief
dissenting opinion (Sutherland, J., again joining) in which, true
to his characteristic disposition to give to the state the benefit of
any doubt as to the reasonableness of "general welfare" legisla-
38. Id. at 390.
39. 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
40. 262 U. S. 404 (1923).
41. 262 U. S. 390, 4p0 (1923).
42. 262 U. S. 390, 401, 403 (1923).
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tion, he expressed the view that the provision in question was not
so plainly arbitrary as to be invalid.
4
3
Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names,44 a hard-fought
and important case (heard with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy)
was an appeal by the Governor of Oregon from a U. S. District
Court decree enjoining the threatened enforcement of a compul-
sory public school attendance law which (with minor exceptions
not relevant here) applied to all primary schools. One of the
appellees was a Catholic sisterhood incorporated for the educa-
tion of youth, and owning and operating schools in which religious
instruction was given according to the Roman Catholic faith. The
other was a privately owned and conducted military academy. The
Court, by Justice McReynolds, said that "the inevitable practical
result of enforcing the Act . . . would be destruction of appellees'
primary schools," and that "there are no peculiar circumstances
or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures re-
lating to primary education."45 Following Meyer v. Nebraska
it is held that the Act "unreasonably interferes with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the unbringing of children under
their control, '48 and tends to destroy the property of both appellees.
The decrees below were affirmed, and it is now settled that com-
pulsory school attendance laws must permit attendance at paro-
chial and private schools which meet public school standards. The
Meyer, Bartels, and Pierce cases were cited and approved in
Farrington v. Tokushigi.4 7 This was another case involving the
teaching of a foreign language in the public schools-this time
Japanese in Hawaii-and it was held that "those fundamental
rights of the individual which" those cases "declared were pro-
tected from infringement by the states, are guaranteed by the 5th
Amendment against action by the territorial legislature or offi-
cers." 4
8
Cochran v. State Bd. of Education49 presents one of those in-
stances where the effect on judicial doctrine and legislative policy
is open to the suspicion of having gone quite beyond what is
found to be warranted when the case is critically examined. An
Act of the Louisiana legislature provided that certain tax funds,
and appropriations as required by the state constitution, should be
43. 262 U. S. 404, 412 (1923).
44. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
45. Id. at 535.
46. Id. at 534.
47. 273 U. S. 284 (1927).
48. Id. at 299.
49. 281 U. S. 370 (1930).
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devoted "first, to supplying school books to the school children of
the state," and the Board of Education was directed to provide
"school books for school children free pf cost." The title of the
appropriation Act for 1928 purported to make appropriations "for
public schools." On appeal of taxpayers to the U. S. Supreme Court
from a decision of the state supreme court denying an injunction,
it was argued that as construed by the majority the purpose and
effect of this legislation was to aid private, religious and other
schools not embraced in the public educational system of the state
by furnishing text books free to the children attending them, and
that thus construed it took private property for a private purpose,
contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the state court a minority vigorously contended that there was
a violation of the provision of the state constitution forbidding
public funds to sectarian or private schools. The Supreme Court
adoptfed the interpretation the Louisiana supreme court had taken
of the legislation,5 and which is quoted as follows in the prevailing
opinion :51
"One may scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money
is appropriated for the purchase of school books for the use of
any church, private, sectarian or even public school. The appro-
priations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school
books for the use of the school children of the state, free of cost
to them. It was for their benefit and the resulting benefit to the state
that the appropriations were made. True, these children attend
some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian or non-sectarian,
and that the books are to be furnished them for their use, free of
cost, whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the
beneficiaries of these appropriations. They obtain nothing from
them, nor are they relieved of a single obligation because of them.
The school children and the state alone are the beneficiaries. It is
also true that the sectarian schools, which some of the children
attend, instruct their pupils in religion, and books are used for
that purpose, but one may search diligently the acts, though without
result, in an effort to find anything to the effect that it is the
purpose of the state to furnish religious books for the use of such
children.... What the statutes contemplate is that the same books
that are furnished children attending public schools shall be
furnished children attending private schools. This is the only prac-
tical way of interpreting and executing the statutes, and this is
what the state board of education is doing. Among these books,
naturally, none is to be expected adapted to religious instruction."
The case was then summarily disposed of in the following language:
50. Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 1020,
123 So. 655, 660 (1929).
51. 281 U. S. 370, 374 (1930).
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"Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed to it,
we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state is exerted for
a public purpose. The legislation does not segregate private schools,
or their pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with
any matters of exclusively private concern. Its interest is educa-
tion, broadly; its method comprehensive. Individual interests are
aided only as the common interest is safeguarded.""2
This case has been referred to as "opening the door" to the
appropriation of public funds for sectarian schools. It was decided
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
shows how far the Court was willing to go in 1930 in following,
wherever possible, the settled policy of upholding the highest court
of a state in its interpretation of a state statute, and accepting its
view as to what constitutes a public purpose in connection with
state taxes. Is not its authority as a precedent limited to the
declaration that state legislation which has been construed by
the highest court of the state to be of the character described by
the Chief Justice is not on its face a taking of private property for
private use without due process of law? While the Louisiana court's
distinction between aiding all school children and aiding schools
which the children attend has been followed in some states and
rejected in others,58 it is noteworthy that this case was not cited
by the Supreme Court until Everson54 except in Carmichael v.
So. Coal and Coke Co.,5" where a tax law was under attack as not
serving a public purpose.
Other phases of the relation between public education and reli-
gion were before the Supreme Court in Hamilton v. University
of California" and the Flag Salute cases."1 The former was a case
of "conscientious objectors," students at the University of Cali-
fornia, who appealed from an order of the Regents, which the
Court held to be action by the state, requiring all students to re-
ceive military instruction. This, the appellants claimed, was con-
trary to their religious beliefs and an infringement upon their
constitutional liberty. An adverse decision of the California su-
52. 281 U. S. 370, 375 (1930).
53. Citations from the state courts may be found in the minority opinion
in Everson v. Board of Education, 133 N. J. L. 350, 357, 44 A. 2d 333, 339
(1945) ; see also Johnson and Yost, Separation of Church and State in the
United States (1948), where many state cases on analogous points are cited
and discussed.
54. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 7 (1947).
55. 301 U. S. 495, 518 (1936).
56. 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
57. Minerville, School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940), and
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
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preme court was affirmed. The Court, speaking by Justice Butler,
recognized more specifically than had been done in previous cases
that the liberty protected by the "due process" clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment includes "the right to entertain the beliefs,
to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which
these students base their objections to the order prescribing mili-
tary training." 8 This, however, did not exempt them from the
order so long as they chose to accept the privileges of the Univer-
sity. Justice Cardozo wrote a separate opinion (Brandeis and
Stone, J. J. joining) wherein he reached the same conclusion by
a slightly different route, laying stress on the light thrown upon
the question by "a century and a half of history during days of
peace and war."5 9 Of the Flag Salute cases, the first, the Gobitis
case, was expressly overruled by the Barnette case, and need not
be discussed here. In Barnette Justices Roberts and Reed adhered
to their views expressed in Gobitis, and Justice Frankfurter pre-
sented a vigorous and elaborate dissenting opinion. The salute to
the flag required of pupils by the public school authorities was
claimed to violate religious convictions protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The prevailing opinion by Justice Jack-
son sustained the refusal to salute under the "free speech" clause
of the First Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justices Black and Douglas, jointly, and Justice Murphy
filed opinions concurring in the result, but putting emphasis on the
fact that the refusal was on religious grounds.
After. reading Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in U. S. v.
Ballard0 (which is cordially recommended to those who relish a
good bit of caustic humor), it is rather hard to take the case
seriously as a precedent in interpreting the First Amendment.
And yet the majority really did present an interpretation. With-
out detailed analysis of the case it will suffice to say that it was a
criminal prosecution for using the mails to defraud by means of
false representations by members of the "I Am" cult, as to ex-
periences claimed to be of a religious nature. The controversy, in
so far as this study is concerned, was as to the propriety of the
trial judge's charge in withdrawing from the jury the issue of
truth of the representations made, and submitting only the ques-
tion of the sincerity of defendants' belief that they were true. The
Court approved the charge on this point, but on other grounds
58. 293 U. S. 245, 262 (1934).
59. 293 U. S. 245, 266 (1934).
60. 322 U. S. 78 (1944).
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remanded the case for further proceedings. Chief Justice Stone
and Justices Roberts and Frankfurter were for reversing the order
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for a new trial and reinstating the
conviction in the District Court, viewing the truth or falsity of
the representations as immaterial. The majority opinion by Justice
Douglas seems to hold that the First Amendment precludes judi-
cial inquiry into the truth of a religious belief, however heretical
or even fantastic it may seem to be. Justice Jackson's dissent may
well be left to speak for itself."'
Beginning with Lovell v. City of Griffin, 2 1938, there have been
before the Supreme Court a great number of cases involving the
religious sect calling themselves Jehovah's Witnesses. With inde-
fatigable (many would say fanatical) zeal and persistence they
have insisted upon the propagation of their peculiar faith by activi-
ties in public places and on private premises which have often met
with extreme popular hostility and have resulted in prosecution
under state laws and municipal ordinances. When thus called to
account they have appealed to courts of the governments to which
as a part of their religious beliefs (doubtless sincere) they refuse
participation as citizens. Nevertheless in pursuing what they claim
to be their constitutional rights they have not stopped short of
our court of last resort, where these claims have received meticu-
lously careful consideration. Most of these cases have involved the
validity of state laws and local ordinances enacted as police regu-
lations, and the question before the Court has been their "reason-
ableness" under the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The great variety of situations with which the Court has
dealt, and the caution with which it has limited its decisions to the
facts before it, make it difficult to present general deductions; but
it may be confidently stated that free speech and religious liberty
61. The Ballard case was again before the Court in 329 U. S. 187
(1946), and Justice Frankfurter (Vinson, C. J., and Jackson and Burton,
J. J., concurring) filed a dissenting opinion sharply criticizing the majority
for ignoring the constitutional question which the minority deemed to be
involved.
In view of the overruling of U. S. v. Mackintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931),
U. S. v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636 (1931), and U. S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S.
644 (1929), by Girouard v. U. S., 328 U. S. 61 (1946), In re Summers, 325
U. S. 561 (1945), is not included in this study. In Girouard the Court, by
Justice Douglas, expressly adopted the views of Justice Holmes and Chief
Justice Hughes in their famous dissents in the Schwimmer and Mac-
kintosh cases, respectively; Chief Justice Stone dissented in an opinion con-
curred in by Justices Reed and Frankfurter, while Justice Jackson did not
sit in the case. All of these cases were decided on issues of statutory con-
struction rather than (directly) constitutional interpretation.
62. 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
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have become more definitely and more liberally recognized in the
settled "law of the land" than they were before 1938. There is no
longer any doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
against state encroachment all the civil and religious rights which
are protected by the first four prohibitions of the First Amend-
ment from violation by Congress, and the traditional presumption
in favor of the "reasonableness" of legislation in this field has
grown less and less conclusive. Indeed, one may surmise that the
frank adoption of justice Murphy's view, that when religious
liberty is curtailed the burden shifts, may be just around the
comer. Of course when "reasonableness" is the test the individuali-
ty of the judge is an important factor; and it is not surprising that
dissents and qualified concurrences have greatly multiplied, and
that changes in the membership of the Court have been followed
by some reversals of former majorities. 3
Discussion of the Everson"' and McCollum8 " decisions still
goes on in the press, assemblies of deeply interested persons and
state courts. In each case the facts held by the Court to be deter-
minative were uncontroverted, and in each an important point of
present dispute is the degree to which the decision ought to be
regarded as limited to the precise facts involved. The significant
facts in the Everson case were as follows: A New Jersey statute
authorized district boards of education to make rules and contracts
for the transpprtation of children to and from schools other than
private schools operated for profit. A board of education by resolu-
tion authorized the reimbursement of parents for fares paid for the
transportation by public carrier of children attending public and
Catholic schools. The Catholic schools operated under the superin-
tendency of a Catholic priest and, in addition to secular education,
gave religious instruction in the Catholic faith. A district taxpayer
challenged the validity under the Federal Constitution of the statute
and resolution, so far as they authorized reimbursement to parents
for the transportation of children attending sectarian schools. No
question was raised as to whether the exclusion of private schools
operated for profit denied equal protection of the laws; nor did
63. A study of the Jehovah Witnesses cases down to Follett v. Town
of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944), may be found in Waite, The Debt of
Constitutional Law to Jeovalh's Witnesses, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 209 (1944).
Later cases are Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946) ; Tucker v. Texas,
326 U. S. 519 (1946); and Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). See
also Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition,
32 Corn. L: Q. 177 (1946).
64.- Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
65. People of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U. S. 203 (1948).
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the record show that there were any children in the district who
attended or would have attended, but for the cost of transportation,
any but public or Catholic schools. The Court held that the expendi-
ture of tax-raised funds thus authorized was for a public purpose,
and did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that the statute and resolution did not violate the pro-
vision of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment) prohibiting any law respecting an
establishment of religion.
The majority opinion was written by Justice Black. H-e dis-
cussed two grounds of attack upon the statute and resolution in
question,- (1) under the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as authorizing the taking by taxation of private prop-
erty to be used for private purposes; and (2) as taxation to help
maintain sectarian schools contrary to the first prohibition of the
First Amendment. It was recognized that these two grounds of
attack "to some extent overlap." As to the first ground it is said
that "the New Jersey legislature has decided that a public purpose
will be served by using tax-raised- funds to pay the bus fares of all
school children, including those who attend parochial schools. The
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals has reached the same
conclusion. The fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need,
coincides with the personal desires of the individuals directly af-
fected is certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legisla-
ture has erroneously appraised the public need. It is true that this
Court has, in rare instances, struck down state statutes on the
ground that the purpose for which tax-raised funds were to be
expended was not a public one .... But the Court has also pointed
out that this far-reaching authority must be exercised with the
most extreme caution. '6 A public purpose being thus recognized,
the measures taken to facilitate the transportation of school children
are rather summarily found to be in aid of that purpose. Here the
Cochran8 7 case at once comes to mind as the nearest approach to a
precedent; but though it was relied on in all the briefs filed for
affirmance it is not cited by the Court except in support of the
rather trite statement that "it is much too late to argue that legisla-
tion intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a
secular (italics supplied) education serves no public purpose."0 8
In discussing the second ground of attack the Court says:
66. 330 U. S. 1, 6 (1947).
67. Cochran v. State Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370 (1930).
68. 330 U. S. 1, 7 (1947).
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"Whether .this New Jersey law is one 'respecting the establish-
ment of religion' requires an understanding of that language, par-
ticularly with respect to the imposition of taxes. Once again, there-
fore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review the background and
environment of the period in which that constitutional language
was fashioned and adopted." After such a review:
"The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in
the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to
suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions
of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to
the states by the Fourteenth. [Citing the Terrett, Watson, Davis,
Reynolds, and Quick Bear cases, mtpra.] The broad meaning given
the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this
Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom
rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make
the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging reli-
gious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application
and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause.
The interrelation of these complementary clauses was well sum-
marized in a statement of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina,
quoted with approval by this Court in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall.
679, 730: 'The structure of our government has, for the preserva-
tion of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious
interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty
from the invasion of the civil authority.' "9 . . . [The State of
New Jersey] "cannot exclude individual Catholics" etc., "or mem-
bers of any other faith, because of their faith or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. While we do
not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation
only to children attending ptiblic schools, we must be careful in
protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established
churches to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all citizens
without regard to their religious belief. feasured by these stan-
dards, we cannot say the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey
from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial
school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays
the fares of pupils attending public and other schools"
Is not this language, on the whole, more suggestive of the position
already taken by the Court in the Meyers, Bartels, Pierce and
Cochrapz decisions than of a de novo interpretation of the prohibi-
tion of laws "respecting an establishment of religion"?
The opinion concludes as follows: "The First Amendment has
69. 330 U5. S. 1, 14, 15.(1947).
70. 330 1U. S. 1, 16, 17 (1947).
19491
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept
high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.
New Jersey has not breached it here."' 1 Justices Jackson and
Rutledge wrote dissenting opinions, Justice Frankfurter joining in
both and Justices Jackson and Burton in the latter. Contrary to
the course pursued in the Cochran case the Court discussed the
facts and came to an independent conclusion that the New Jersey
court was correct in holding that the legislation in question was in
pursuance of a public purpose. The writer suggests that the more
carefully one studies the complete discussion of the "overlapping"
grounds of attack in the three opinions, the more clear it becomes
that this was the focal point, the net result being a holding that,
the purpose being public-i.e., promotive of the general welfare
and not discriminatory-incidental assistance to religious schools
did not bring the situation within the prohibitions of the Consti-
tution.
In the McColhrnt72 case, however, direct and purposeful aid to
religion, though without discrimination or appreciable public ex-
pense, was found by the Court. Here the unanimous decision of
the Supreme Court of Illinois was overruled. The facts can be
succinctly stated as follows: A board of education, exercising its
general supervisory powers over the use of public school buildings,
permitted religious teachers employed, subject to the approval
and supervision of the superintendent of schools, by a private reli-
gious group including representatives of the Catholic, Protestant
and Jewish faiths, to give religious instruction in public school
buildings once each week. Pupils whose parents so requested were
excused from their secular classes during the periods of religious
instruction and were required to attend the religious classes; but
other pupils were not released from their public school duties,
which were compulsory under state law. A resident and taxpayer
of the school district whose child was enrolled in the public schools
sued in a state court for a writ of mandamus requiring the board
of education to terminate this practice. The Court's conclusion,
announced in a brief opinion by Justice Black, was that such utiliza-
tion of the State's tax-supported public school system and its
machinery for compulsory public school attendance to enable sec-
tarian groups to give religious instruction to public school pupils in
public school buildings violated the First Amendment of the Con-
stitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
71. 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947).
72. People ex ret. McCollum, v. Board of Education, 396 111. 14, 71
N. E. 2d 161 (1947).
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ment. This conclusion was held to be in line with and required by
the Everson decision. No other case was cited as a precedent, and
the Court said:
"Recognizing that the Illinois program is barred by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments if we adhere to the views expressed
both by the majority and the minority in the Everson case, coun-
sel for the respondents challenge those views as dicta and urge that
we reconsider and repudiate them. They argue that historically
the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government
preference of one religion over another, not an impartial govern-
ment assistance to all religions. In addition they ask that we dis-
tinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the
Fourteeth Amendment made the 'establishment of religion' clause
of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the
States. After giving full consideration to the arguments presented
we are unable to accept either of these contentions."--3
Justice Frankfurter presented an independent opinion, much
of which might have been prepared as a dissent in Everson, with
a review of the origin and spread of the "released time" plan for
religious education. Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Burton joined
in this, and Justice Jackson, in what is termed a "concurring"
opinion, reflected important differences of view both as to facts
and law. Justice Reed wrote a vigorous dissent. We quote only
its concluding sentences:
"This Court cannot be too cautious in upsetting practices em-
bedded in our society by many years of experience. A state is
entitled to have great leeway in its legislation when dealing with
the important social problems of its population. A definite violation
of legislative limits must be established. The Constitution should
not be stretched to forbid national customs in the way courts act
to reach arrangements to avoid federal taxation. Devotion to the
great principle of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid
interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with
accepted habits of our people.
'74
While the McCollum decision relies in part on the fact that
religious instruction was given in the school building, it is a fair
inference from the language of the majority opinion that the con-
clusion would have been the same if this fact had been otherwise;
and such seems to have been the view of the other members of the
Court who wrote opinions.
7 5
73. 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948).
74. 333 U. S. 203, 256 (1948).
75. The final order entered in the Illinois court where the action origi-
nated was as follows: "It is hereby ordered (1) that the Board of Education
of Community Unit School District No. 4, Champaign County, Illinois, im-
mediately adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction
in and teaching of religious education in the manner heretofore conducted
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Is it not a fair summary of the two cases to say that, taking
them together, while all the members of the Court agreed that
either purposeful or discriminatory aid to religion, through legisla-
tion by a state, is prohibited by the 1st and 14th Amendments, five
held that the facts in the Everson case did not constitute such aid,
while four thought otherwise; and that on the facts in the McCol-
lur case the conclusion was eight to one in the affirmative? Jus-
tice Reed seems to go further, having in mind a definition of
"religion" like that adopted in the DaVis7 0 case, and holding the
view that even purposeful aid to the general cause of religion,
without compulsion, discrimination or diversion of public funds,
is not within the interpretation of the First Amendment to which
he had agreed in the Everson case. Did he perhaps recall the words
of Justice Story, in the first case involving religion which came
before the new Court, that "The free exercise of religion cannot be
justly deemed restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries
of every sect to perform their own religious duties"?"7
In view of the long-established policy of the Court to avoid
unnecessary interpretation of the Constitution, it is somewhat sur-
prising to find in the opinions in both cases the following state-
ment of what all agree upon as to the meaning of the "establish-
ment of religion" prohibition in the First Amendment:
1. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church.
2. "Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another.
3. "Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to re-
main away from church against his will or force him to pro-
fess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
4. "No person can be punished for entertaining or for profess-
ing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance.
5. "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
by said School District Number 71, in all public schools within the original
School District Number 71, Champaign County, Illinois, and in all public
school houses and buildings in said district when occupied by public schools;
and
(2) to prohibit within said original School District No. 71 the use
of the state's public school machinery to help enroll pupils in the several
religious classes of sectarian groups."
76. Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1889) ; see p. 498, mspra.
77. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch. 43, 48 (1815).
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may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion.
6. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups, and vice versa."18
Of these pronouncements Nos. 1, 3 and 4 cover matters that
have not been before the Court; and it does not seem probable that
they will ever come up for decision. The others cover general prin-
ciples, each so stated as to be subject to discriminatory interpreta-
tion according to the facts in the particular case, viewed from
diverse individual standpoints, and in each instance fairly open
to the claim of such construction as to contravene existing prac-
tices of the states and the Federal Government which have not yet
been questioned in the Supreme Court.
From its adoption until the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 the Federal Constitution provided no curb
upon the attitude of the several states toward the establishment of
religion or restrictions upon religious liberty; and it was not until
long afterward that the Supreme Court began to recognize its
"due process" clause as including rights guaranteed by the First.
The Everson and McCollum cases are the first to be decided under
an express declaration that this inclusion extends to the prohibi-
tion of state legislation "respecting an establishment of religion."
It is therefore natural that the factual situations found in Everson
and McCollum should exist, with variations, in other states, and
should be responsive to state laws differing according to local con-
ditions. This fact, together with the vagueness of the phrase "re-
specting an establishment of religion," and the diversity and inten-
sity of the views of interested groups, suggests that we may have
here a source of Constitutional litigation quite as prolific as the
erratic zeal of Jehovah's Witnesses has been. The fact that this
study has developed no clear precedent for the Everson and McCol-
ure decisions seems important; while the points actually decided in
the earlier cases, and the quoted comments of the Court, may pro-
vide an atmosphere favorable to the evaluation .of the two most
recent decisions, which together provide a starting point for ex-
ploration of a new field. It seems obvious that they do not go far
toward furnishing a final interpretation of so elastic a phrase as
78. This statement is found in Justice Black's opinion of the majority
in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15, 16; and is quoted in his




"respecting an establishment of religion." In the relations of our
state and national governments to religion, organized and un-
organized, much remains to be determined.
All will agree that the object sought in the first two prohibitions
of the First Amendment was to declare and protect the principle of
religious liberty. After nearly a century and a half the scope of
the second seems pretty well established,-and it has become very
broad. If the first, now coming to the fore, is to be applied with
due regard to existing conditions and the spirit of the times, must
not the Court adopt a more positive and forward-looking attitude
than it has yet taken? Is such an attitude disclosed by emphasis
upon "a wall of separation between church and state"? Do not the
concept of religious liberty and the distinction between religion
and a religious cultus,-i.e. a sect or organized church,-made long
ago in Davis v. Beason,75 suggest sounder bases of interpreta-
tion ?so
Jefferson's phrase was a shout of triumph after a winning
fight against new-world remnants of old-world ecclesiasticism. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut"' we find a summary of that great victory
in words more likely to be useful under twentieth century condi-
tions: "The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject
of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls com-
pulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of
any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other
hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of reli-
gion."82
79. 133 U. S. 333 (1889).
80. The case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 288 U. S.
510 (1925), discussed at p. 000, supra, was not decided by reference to the
First Amendment; but fundamental to that decision is the concept of re-
ligious liberty-that of Catholic parents to choose religious schools for their
children in the face of a compulsory education law enacted to require
attendance of all children at public, non-religious schools
81. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
82. Id. at 303; Justice Roberts for the unanimous Court.
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